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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND
THE BORDER PATROL: APPLYING THE
“PRIMARY PURPOSE” TEST TO
MULTIFUNCTION AGENCIES
*

CALEB MASON & JESSICA BERCH

**

The right of criminal defendants to confront the witnesses against
them is one of our most cherished constitutional protections. Yet the
meaning and scope of the right have never been clearly defined by the
Supreme Court. In 2004, the Court rejected earlier interpretations of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as vague and uncertain. It
unmoored the constitutional question from the hearsay exceptions and
replaced the old test with a new one, which has turned out to be quite clear
in some areas, but maddeningly uncertain in others: A statement will be
excluded if it is “testimonial.” In later cases, the Court explained that a
statement is testimonial if its “primary purpose” is to assist in gathering
facts for use in a future criminal prosecution.
The primary purpose test for determining whether interactions
between government agents and hearsay declarants are testimonial has
caused confusion for courts, commentators, and law enforcement
officers—not to mention provoking perhaps the nastiest dissent in recent
1
memory. Just last year, in 2012, the Supreme Court once again attempted
to clarify primary purpose, but only managed to further confuse the
doctrine when the Justices’ opinions split 4–1–4.
In this Article, we propose a method for applying the primary
purpose test in a law-enforcement context that increasingly includes
multifunction agencies whose duties may be only tangentially connected
to the investigation and prosecution of crime. We propose that the
primary purpose of an interaction should be determined, in part, by a
statistical evaluation of the relative likelihood of criminal prosecution
among the various possible outcomes of a particular category of agent* Caleb Mason, Associate, Miller Barondess, L.L.P.
** Jessica Berch, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
1. In dissent in Michigan v. Bryant, Justice Scalia critically questioned the Court’s
decision “to resurrect [the pre-Crawford landscape] by a thousand unprincipled distinctions”
without explicitly overruling Crawford. 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1175 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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witness interactions. We then demonstrate how this approach would
apply in several situations, particularly those involving the United States
Border Patrol—the epitome of a modern multifunction agency with
mixed civil and criminal enforcement duties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A United States Border Patrol agent on routine duty encounters two
people walking in the desert near the border. He approaches and
commands them to stop. The agent then separates the two individuals
and asks the first one, “Where are you two from?” Person 1 (P-1)
answers, implicating himself and his co-walker, P-2, as being in the
country illegally. P-2 is later charged with a crime, such as illegal
reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. If P-1 is unavailable at trial, is his answer
to the agent’s question admissible against P-2 under the Confrontation
Clause?
This is not an idle hypothetical: Immigration-related crimes are the
most commonly charged federal crimes, and establishing the nationality
and identity of people encountered by the Border Patrol is a critical part
2
of the government’s case. Putting aside any objections on hearsay or
other grounds under the Federal Rules of Evidence, one must ask the
question: Does the Constitution permit the prosecution to offer such
statements in evidence at trial through the testimony of the agent?
The framework we propose in this Article for answering this
question will provide a meaningful template for determining whether
the Confrontation Clause bars such statements. The “primary purpose”
test for “testimonial” statements, and the application of that test to
these informal interactions, is likely to become increasingly significant as
the lines between national security, civil regulation, criminal
3
prosecution, and law enforcement continue to blur.
4
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Michigan v. Bryant provided
2. See infra Part III for discussion of cases in which this situation arises. For discussion
of recent federal charging trends, see Caleb E. Mason & Scott M. Lesowitz, A Rational PostBooker Proposal for Reform of Federal Sentencing Enhancements for Prior Convictions, 31 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 339, 340 n.1 (2011).
3. As mentioned in Part III.B.4, infra, various other agencies, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), also have multiple
functions and may not always be principally concerned with ferreting out and prosecuting
crimes.
4. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). But see Williams v. Illinois, 132
S. Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012) (a fractured 4–1–4 Confrontation Clause decision without a majority
of Justices agreeing on what primary purpose means). The Williams four-Justice plurality
requires that the primary purpose relate to the accusation of a particular targeted individual.
132 S. Ct. at 2242. The four-Justice dissent’s approach directs attention to evidence
potentially useful in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting). In an opinion
concurring in the judgment only, Justice Thomas decries any version of the primary purpose
test. Id. at 2261–62 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). In a case where the statement
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some needed clarification of the enigmatic opinions in Davis
(precluding statements with a primary purpose of criminal investigation)
6
and Crawford (precluding testimonial statements) It also provided
clues as to how the Court may apply the Confrontation Clause in the
broader context of multifunction agencies that have missions that
include, but are not limited to, investigating crime.
This Article suggests a general approach to analyzing Confrontation
Clause claims that arise with respect to multifunction agencies, such as
the Border Patrol. We propose that to decide the primary purpose of a
given interaction, courts should consider statistical data and agency
7
policies to determine the relative probability of criminal prosecution.
That is, determining whether an interaction has a primary purpose of
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution should be informed by the
statistical likelihood (the frequency) of a criminal prosecution resulting
from that type of interaction.
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Before Crawford: Confrontation Rights as Hearsay Rights
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, in
criminal cases, the accused has the right to confront the witnesses
8
against him. For most of its history, the Clause was read as largely
coextensive with the hearsay rules, so it provided little independent
9
authority for precluding evidence. As hearsay law grew more nuanced
and sprouted more legislatively created exceptions following the

relates to a previously identified suspect, the primary purpose doctrine will be satisfied
regardless of which of the two tests is adopted.
5. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). In Davis, the eight-member majority
adopted the primary purpose test in the following passage: “[Statements] are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate . . . that the primary purpose . . . is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 822.
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7. Current law looks at the primary purpose of the interaction from both the officer’s
and the declarant’s perspective. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160; see also infra notes 58–59 and
accompanying text. But see Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 266, 274 n.76 (2012) (“The
Justices also have not resolved the question of whose primary purpose matters, thereby
further fracturing the primary purpose test.”). The test proposed by this Article may either
supplement or supplant that inquiry.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155–56 (1970).
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adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, the Supreme Court
began to separate the right of confrontation under the Constitution from
the reliability question addressed by many exceptions to the hearsay
rules.
Before that separation began, in Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court
developed a test for evaluating the admissibility of out-of-court
11
statements against criminal defendants. First, the declarant must be
12
Next, if the declarant is unavailable, the out-of-court
unavailable.
statement offered against the defendant must have adequate “indicia of
13
reliability.” A statement has adequate “indicia of reliability” if it falls
into a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or bears other “particularized
14
Hearsay questions, including
guarantees of trustworthiness.”
confrontation claims, thus were resolved by asking whether the
challenged testimony fit into a long-established hearsay category or was
15
otherwise trustworthy.
B. The New Doctrine: Crawford
16

In 2004, Crawford v. Washington changed all that. In that case, the
Supreme Court wrestled with whether the Confrontation Clause
allowed the use of hearsay statements admitted under the exception for
17
statements against penal interest.
In Crawford, a husband and wife were alleged to have participated
18
in an assault.
They were arrested, Mirandized, and interrogated
10. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) (describing hearsay and its
exceptions as “an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by
cubists, futurists and surrealists” (quoting Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire,
Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937))).
11. Id. at 65–66.
12. Id. at 65.
13. Id. at 65–66.
14. Id. at 66. The Court noted as follows:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even
then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of reliability[.]”
Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Id. at 38, 42.
Id. at 38.
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separately. The wife made statements incriminating her husband in the
assault, and she admitted that she had led her husband to the victim’s
20
apartment and told him that the victim had previously assaulted her.
Because of state marital privilege rules, the prosecution could not call
her to testify at her husband’s criminal trial for assault, so instead the
prosecution sought to admit her statement as a statement against penal
interest on the grounds that she had admitted to “facilitat[ing] the
21
assault.” The state courts went back and forth analyzing the answer to
the Confrontation Clause question (namely, the reliability of the
22
statement), ultimately admitting the statement.
In a sweeping opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the entire
23
Roberts framework. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause has
24
nothing to do with reliability, or with rootedness or hearsay exceptions.
The Confrontation Clause analysis does not simply incorporate the most
25
reliable hearsay exceptions. Instead, the Court determined that the
Clause provides a categorical rule excluding all, and only, “testimonial”
26
hearsay. Out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” are barred
even if they fit into a firmly rooted hearsay exception; conversely,
19. Id. at 38–39.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 40.
22. Id. at 40–42 (summarizing procedural history).
23. Id. at 61, 63–68; see also, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2232 (2012) (“[I]n
Crawford, the Court adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation
right . . . .”).
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–61, 68–69.
25. Id. at 60.
26. Id. at 53, 68–69. According to the Court, the term testimonial covers, at a minimum,
“prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations.” Id. at 68. The Court also took note of other formulations and
definitions of the term “testimonial,” but declined, for purposes of the Crawford decision, to
expand the term beyond the situations set forth above. See id. at 51–52. The Court continued
to note,
Various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist: ex parte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to
be used prosecutorially[;] extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions[;] statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial . . . . These formulations all share a common nucleus and then define
the Clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.
Id. (ellipses in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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statements that are not “testimonial” pose no Confrontation Clause
problem, irrespective of their admissibility or inadmissibility as
27
hearsay.
Thus, the question posed in the Border Patrol agent
hypothetical becomes whether the elicited statement is “testimonial”
within the meaning of Crawford and its progeny.
The historical and etymological basis for the majority’s analysis in
28
Crawford has been severely criticized, and the Court itself has
acknowledged that the decision has probably lessened the reliability of
29
admissible hearsay in criminal cases. But the basic doctrine is likely
here to stay. It has not, however, simplified Confrontation Clause
analysis; rather, it has created a new analytical problem for the use of
hearsay in criminal cases: What exactly does “testimonial” mean?
The Court did not precisely define the term in Crawford, but did
30
provide some guidance. “Testimonial” statements can be divided into
two general categories, one easy to apply and one more difficult. The
easy category encompasses trial testimony, affidavits, and depositions:
formal statements made and memorialized in actual litigation. The
Court clarified the law as to the “easy” category in Melendez-Diaz and

27. Id. at 68–69.
28. For example, Justice Scalia’s definition of “witness” is actually the fifth of five
definitions in the 1828 edition of Webster’s, as Professor Jonakait explains:
Webster did not just give one definition, as Crawford implied, but five for the noun
“witness.” Crawford selected the last of those meanings as the one incorporated
into the Confrontation Clause. It states, “One who gives testimony; as, the witnesses
in court agreed in all essential facts.” Crawford, however, simply ignored Webster’s
third definition of the noun “witness,” which states, “A person who knows or sees
any thing; one personally present; as, he was witness; he was an eye-witness.” This
meaning links with Webster’s first definition of a “witness” as a transitive verb: “To
see or know by personal experience. I witnessed the ceremonies in New York, with
which the ratification of the constitution was celebrated, in 1788.”
Randolph N. Jonakait, “Witnesses” in the Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington,
Noah Webster, and Compulsory Process, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 155, 159 (2006) (emphases in
original) (citations omitted).
29. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“[W]hatever improvement in
reliability Crawford produced [in that respect] must be considered together with Crawford’s
elimination of Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable out-ofcourt nontestimonial statements. . . . Under Crawford, . . . the Confrontation Clause has no
application to such statements and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia
of reliability.”). In Williams, the four-Justice plurality found the DNA report nontestimonial,
but, nonetheless, went out of its way to establish the reliability of the report. Williams v.
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228, 2238–40 (2012).
30. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (defining testimonial).
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31

Bullcoming. For example, in Melendez-Diaz, the Court determined
whether state laws permitting hearsay introduction of forensic reports
on drug analysis (without the live trial testimony of the chemists) were
32
permissible under the Confrontation Clause. As the majority noted,
Melendez-Diaz is an easy case once you accept that the Court meant
33
what it said in Crawford. The forensic reports—formal statements
made in preparation for trial—were the very epitome of testimonial
34
evidence.
If a government chemist, at the request of prosecutors,
prepares an affidavit stating that a substance is cocaine then, during the
criminal trial, the prosecution must call that chemist. The use of state
hearsay exceptions to permit introduction of such affidavits in criminal
35
cases is unconstitutional.
Formal statements or affidavits present the straightforward case, of
36
course.
More difficult calls may emerge from the informal verbal
interactions between potential witnesses and government actors. To
provide guidance, the Court in Crawford offered “various formulations”
37
One, which was
of the “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.”
proposed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL), appeared to cover most, if not all, police–witness
interactions: “[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
38
would be available for use at a later [criminal] trial.”
The Court
explained that the definition was set forth merely as one of several
proposed formulations, and that the Court did not need in that case to
announce a definition of “testimonial” because the post-arrest
interrogations present in Crawford “are testimonial under even a

31. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–11 (2009).
32. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307, 310–11.
33. Id. at 310–11.
34. Id. at 307, 310.
35. Id. at 329; see also Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (holding that a blood alcohol
analysis report was testimonial).
36. Or perhaps not so easy. As discussed in more detail infra Part II.C.3, the Supreme
Court recently struggled with the admissibility of an expert’s reliance on a DNA profile
report in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
37. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
38. Id. at 52 (citing Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL
21754961, at *3).
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39

narrow standard.” Nonetheless, a number of courts, perhaps frustrated
by the lack of a definition, have used versions of the NACDL
40
formula —including the Supreme Court itself in its Melendez-Diaz
41
analysis.
C. The Primary Purpose Test: Davis, Bryant, and Williams
The boundaries of the difficult category—informal interactions
between government agents and witnesses—have not been precisely
drawn. Instead, in Davis, the Court enunciated the primary purpose test
42
for determining when such evidence is “testimonial.” The test asks
whether the primary purpose of the interaction in which the statement
was made can reasonably be described as being “to establish or prove
43
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
1. Davis v. Washington
Davis and its companion case, Hammon v. Indiana, presented the
Court with two variations of witness statements, both from victims in
44
domestic violence cases.
In Davis, the statement was the victim’s
45
recorded 911 call. In response to questions from the operator, she
described the contemporaneous behavior of the defendant, in the
46
present tense, as she was observing it. In Hammon, the police arrived
at the house in response to a domestic violence call, determined that no
one was hurt and no violence was ongoing, and then separated the
47
victim and the defendant and asked the victim what had happened.
The Court held that the 911 call was not testimonial, but the on-

39. Id.
40. See J.P. Schnapper–Casteras & David Ellis, The Trouble with Testimoniality:
Subjective-Objective Ambiguity and Other Problems with Crawford’s Third Formulation, 47
CRIM. L. BULL. 1186, 1195–96 (2011) (citing United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1303
(10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 201 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537, 543 (1st Cir.
2007); United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hinton, 423
F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004); United
States v. Foerster, 65 M.J. 120, 123 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
41. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009).
42. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 817–21.
45. Id. at 817–18.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 819–21 (citing Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446–47 (Ind. 2005)).
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48

scene post-emergency interview was. In reaching its conclusions, the
Court finally announced a definition, of sorts, of “testimonial”:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements—or even all conceivable statements in
response to police interrogation—as either testimonial or
nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as
follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are
testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
49
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
50

Thus, the inquiry focuses on the primary purpose of the interview.
If the primary purpose is to assist with the response to an ongoing
51
emergency, the statement is nontestimonial.
But if the primary
purpose is to establish facts for a criminal investigation or prosecution,
52
Because, in Hammon, the officers
the statement is testimonial.
questioned the victim after they had secured the premises and separated
53
54
the suspect and the victim, her responses were “testimonial.” On the
other hand, in Davis, because the 911 call was made during the crisis as
part of the victim’s present observation and narration of the suspect’s
actions (“He’s here jumpin’ on me again,” etc.), her statements were not
55
In sum, a statement made to a 911 operator by a
“testimonial.”
declarant reporting an ongoing emergency is not testimonial (the Davis
56
facts), while the same statement made a few minutes later to
investigating officers arriving at the scene “after the events described
57
were over” is testimonial (the Hammon facts).
48. Id. at 822.
49. Id. (emphases added).
50. The question of whose perspective on that purpose controls was left open and finally
was answered in Bryant. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011); see infra notes 58–
59 and accompanying text.
51. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
52. Id. at 830.
53. Id. at 820.
54. Id. at 830–31.
55. Id. at 817, 827–28.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 830–31.
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The Davis opinion left uncertain whether the primary purpose
should be viewed from the perspective of the declarant or from that of
the interrogating police officer. The distinction drawn by the Court—
between responding to an ongoing emergency and developing facts for
58
prosecution—seems to view the question from the officer’s perspective.
Bryant put the uncertainty to rest by holding that courts must consider
59
both perspectives.
But the question of perspective was not the most serious difficulty
with the application of the Davis primary purpose test. That difficulty
runs deeper, and was anticipated by Justice Thomas: Even in the
clearest fact pattern, such as beat cops responding to a 911 call of
domestic violence currently in progress, there are often several purposes
60
to the officers’ questions and interactions with witnesses. As Justice
Thomas noted, it will be difficult to create rules that courts can follow to
non-arbitrarily assign primacy of purpose in many regularly occurring
61
law enforcement scenarios.
2. Michigan v. Bryant
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Michigan v. Bryant further
62
clarified the primary purpose doctrine. In Bryant, the police responded
63
to a report that a man had been shot. They found the victim bleeding
64
on the ground next to his car at a gas station. They asked him “what
had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had
65
occurred.” The conversation lasted “5 to 10 minutes,” until paramedics
66
67
arrived. The victim later died at the hospital. The Court had to
58. Id. at 822.
59. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“[T]he statements and actions of
both the declarant and interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the
interrogation.”). Justice Scalia, in dissent, said that only the declarant’s perspective should
matter. Id. at 1168–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because Justice Scalia authored Davis, perhaps
he should have been clearer, or tried to create consensus, about whose perspective matters
when he wrote that opinion. Had he done so, much of the confusion about the meaning of
Davis’s primary purpose test could have been averted.
60. Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in
part).
61. Id. at 838 (complaining that the majority’s primary purpose test “yields no
predictable results to police officers and prosecutors attempting to comply with the law”).
62. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143.
63. Id. at 1150.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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articulate the proper constitutional characterization of what the police
were doing when they questioned the victim: Were they developing facts
for a future prosecution, or were they responding to an ongoing
68
emergency? If the former, admission of the statements would violate
the Confrontation Clause; if the latter, such admission would not violate
the Clause.
The Supreme Court held that the police were responding to an
ongoing emergency because the shooter was still at large, and his
69
identity and location were unknown. Thus, the fact that the assault was
70
not ongoing was not dispositive.
An obvious import of Bryant’s
holding, then, is that “emergency response” is a fairly capacious
71
concept, and may extend beyond the actual commission of the crime.
But, importantly, for the sake of future application of this doctrine,
the Court also finally provided a fairly clear framework for analyzing
these recurring fact patterns. First, the Court clarified the problem of
perspective: Courts must look from both the declarant’s and
72
interrogator’s perspectives. Second, the Court clarified that the test is
objective, not subjective: The actual intentions of the participants are
not dispositive. Instead, they are relevant only insofar as they may
inform the court’s analysis of how an objective, reasonable observer
73
would interpret the interaction.
Finally, the Court recognized (for the first time explicitly in these
cases) the possibility of several coexisting purposes in addition to
“emergency response” and “criminal investigation”:
But there may be other circumstances, aside from ongoing
emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1162, 1165. Perhaps portions of the conversation were for the former purpose,
and others for the latter. But the Court did not so granularly dissect the conversation.
69. Id. at 1164–67.
70. Id. at 1160–65.
71. Id. at 1158. The plurality takes this to an extreme in Williams because even a delay
of nine-to-thirteen months may still be part of the ongoing emergency of identifying a suspect.
See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2274 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The police did
not send the swabs to Cellmark until November 2008—nine months after L.J.’s rape—and did
not receive the results for another four months. That is hardly the typical emergency
response.”).
72. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160–61. But see id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
declarant’s intent is what counts.”).
73. Id. at 1160–62.
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In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be
relevant.
Where no such primary purpose exists, the
admissibility of a statement is the concern of state and federal
74
rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.
Thus, starting with Bryant, a fairly clear rule began to emerge: Any
interaction in which the objectively determined primary purpose is
something other than developing facts for a criminal investigation is
75
nontestimonial (that is, admissible) for Confrontation Clause purposes.
3. Williams v. Illinois
The Supreme Court’s latest foray into the Confrontation Clause
doctrine yielded a badly fractured 4–1–4 decision that raised more
76
questions than it answered. Five Justices held that the Confrontation
Clause does not bar an expert witness from testifying on the basis of a
77
lab report prepared by another analyst who does not testify at trial.
78
The plurality of four advanced two reasons supporting that result.
First, the expert’s testimony was not admitted to prove the truth of the
79
matters asserted in the lab report. Second, and of importance to this
Article, the plurality adopted a modified version of the primary purpose
test and explained that, because the forensic report did not have the
primary purpose “of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in
80
The other five
criminal conduct,” the report was nontestimonial.

74. Id. at 1155.
75. We leave to the side for purposes of this Article Justice Sotomayor’s comment that
the reliability of a given category of statements is “relevant” to the primary purpose
determination. Id. at 1155. That line has drawn fire from Justice Scalia, see id. at 1174–75
(Scalia, J., dissenting), applause from Justice Kennedy, see Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.
Ct. 2705, 2725 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and perplexity from commentators, see, e.g.,
Michael D. Cicchini, Dead Again: The Latest Demise of the Confrontation Clause, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1310–16 (2011); Jason Widdison, Michigan v. Bryant: The Ghost of
Roberts and the Return of Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 230–33 (2011).
76. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. 2221. The Harvard Law Review described the case this way:
“The lack of either a majority opinion or a clear holding, in addition to the internal flaws of
the various opinions, deeply muddles Confrontation Clause doctrine, leaving the [C]lause’s
application to forensic evidence in question.” Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 267.
77. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228.
78. Id. at 2235–42.
79. Id. at 2235–41.
80. Id. at 2242 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2243 (finding that the primary purpose of
the report was “to catch a dangerous rapist . . . not to obtain evidence for use against
[Williams], who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that time”).
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Justices disagreed with the plurality’s new explication of the primary
81
purpose test. Justice Thomas, writing for himself alone, criticized the
old primary purpose test as impractical and the plurality’s new
formulation of requiring a particular person to be under suspicion as
82
divorced from the text of the Sixth Amendment. The four dissenters
argued that whether the police have a suspect at the time a forensic
report is conducted “makes not a whit of difference” for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause and advocated for the retention of the Davis
83
formulation of primary purpose.
Thus, the primary purpose doctrine now has two different tests, each
supported by four Justices. The plurality’s test finds a statement
“testimonial” if it has “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
84
individual of engaging in criminal conduct . . . .” The four dissenting
Justices adhere to the prior Davis test requiring the statements to have a
85
Justice
primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case.
86
Thomas prefers to abandon the primary purpose test entirely.
D. Foreseeability of Prosecution is Not the Test
Given the vague explanation of “testimonial” in Crawford and the
87
“muddled” primary purpose test in Williams, it is not surprising that
some courts, practitioners, and police officers occasionally have
conflated the primary purpose test with the foreseeability of criminal
88
prosecution; that is, if criminal prosecution is “foreseeable,” then the
89
interaction is “testimonial.” That analysis may be tempting—and it is
the analysis Justice Scalia argued for in dissent in Bryant—but it is not
90
the law.
Davis could have announced foreseeability as the test—
81. Id. at 2264–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting); id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
82. Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. Id. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2242 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 2273–74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
87. Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 272.
88. See, e.g., Schnapper–Casteras & Ellis, supra note 40, at 1195–96 (collecting postDavis cases that use the “reasonable foreseeability” formulation).
89. See, e.g., id.
90. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the right test is whether the speaker understood that his statement “may be used to invoke
the coercive machinery of the State against the accused”). That formulation has Professor
Friedman’s endorsement as well. See Richard D. Friedman, Who Said the Crawford
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“whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would foresee that
the statement would be available for use in a criminal prosecution”—but
91
the Court did not do that.
The Davis test does not turn on the foreseeability of a criminal
92
prosecution; instead, it turns on the primary purpose of the interaction.
No stretch of legal or grammatical imagination can make the two
categories entirely symmetrical: If an officer has a primary purpose and
two secondary purposes, all of them are foreseeable, but only one is
primary. The officer with the primary purpose of saving a shooting
victim (or locating the perpetrator and perhaps stopping another crime)
when he asks “What happened to you?” also knows, with a certainty
well beyond mere foreseeability, that the answer will likely serve as
evidence in a criminal prosecution. The officer will preserve the answer
by writing it down in his report for later use. In the example, saving the
victim is the primary purpose; obtaining the facts to identify a suspect,
prepare for criminal prosecution, and potentially forestall a future crime
is a secondary purpose; and writing a complete and accurate report is a
93
A “foreseeability” test would make the interaction
third purpose.
“testimonial” every time, but the Davis primary purpose analysis would
deem such an interaction nontestimonial because the primary purpose is
94
to save the victim.
Revolution Would Be Easy?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2012, at 14, 19 (“In the long run, I believe
that the [C]ourt will adopt a sound view of what is testimonial, based on the reasonable
anticipation of a person in the position of the speaker . . . .”).
91. See generally Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (adopting the primary
purpose test, not a foreseeability test). If the Court had made foreseeability, rather than
primary purpose, the rubric, contemporaneous 911 calls would be “testimonial” because
reasonable people know that 911 calls are recorded and are often used in criminal
prosecutions. Of course, the Supreme Court in Davis did not provide such a result-oriented
explanation for its holding, but such logic may have been a reason why the Court shied away
from announcing the foreseeability test.
In fact, foreseeability has not worked particularly well even in the torts field from which
it originated. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 29 (2010) (“A foreseeability test for negligence cases risks being misunderstood
because of uncertainty about what must be foreseen, by whom, and at what time.”). Almost
anything remotely related may be considered “foreseeable.” Id.; see generally Ryan B.
Abbott, Treating the Health Care Crisis: Complementary and Alternative Medicine for ACA,
14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 35, 90 (2012) (discussing the role of foreseeability in the
torts field).
92. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
93. On the problem of “multiple concurrent purposes,” see, e.g., Marc McAllister,
Evading Confrontation: From One Amorphous Standard to Another, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
473, 500–03 (2012).
94. Michael Cicchini proposes that “the term testimonial should be defined as all . . .
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1. The Difference Between Foreseeability and Primary Purpose:
Illustration in the Caselaw
The Ninth Circuit’s post-Crawford Confrontation Clause decisions
in prosecutions for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326 illustrate the distinction between foreseeability and primary
95
purpose. In illegal reentry cases, the government must prove that the
defendant-alien (1) was deported and (2) physically removed from the
United States and (3) did not receive permission to return, but
96
(4) nonetheless did return. The second and third elements—previous
removal and lack of permission to return—are typically proved by
97
introducing documents from the defendant’s Alien File, or “A-File.”
The court’s analysis in these cases supports two propositions we
endorse in this Article. First, the possibility of future prosecution is
necessary, but not sufficient, to make an interaction testimonial; and
second, the statistical likelihood of future prosecution among multiple
possible outcomes is a significant factor in the primary purpose analysis.
a. Certificate of Non-Existence of Record: Testimonial
In reentry cases, the prosecution proves the defendant’s lack of
permission to return by presenting a “certificate of non-existence of
record” (CNR), which is an affidavit that states that a Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) official has reviewed all the applicable
records and determined that the defendant has not received permission

hearsay that tends to establish in any way an element of the crime or the identification of the
defendant.” Cicchini, supra note 75, at 1321 (emphasis omitted); see also Michael Cicchini &
Vincent Rust, Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington: Defining “Testimonial,” 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 531, 550 n.126 (2006). Cicchini seems to have just defined
relevance. If evidence does not tend in any way to establish an element of the crime or the
identification of the defendant, then the evidence simply is not relevant. So Cicchini’s
proposed rule is just a “no hearsay against criminal defendants” rule. Such a rule might make
sense if the Court were devising trial rules from scratch or attempting to emulate historical
practice. But Cicchini’s formulation does not seem useful for predicting the future course of
cases in this area.
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006); see, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156,
1159–67 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830–34 (9th Cir.
2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009).
96. 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
97. See News Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., USCIS Begins Transfer
of
Historical
A-Files
to
National
Archives
(Jun.
3,
2009),
available
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/A-files_3jun09.pdf.
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98

to re-enter.
Because an applicable hearsay rule permits such
99
evidence, these certificates were, at least before Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, generally introduced through a testifying case agent who
usually was not the particular DHS official who conducted the records
100
But after Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, courts have
review.
uniformly held CNRs to be testimonial because they are only prepared
101
for presentation at trial. That is, the primary, or indeed only, reason
the search is carried out and the affidavit generated is to create evidence
102
for trial.
Thus, under the Supreme Court’s tests, the CNR is
testimonial, and whoever performed the search must testify at the
103
defendant’s criminal trial.
b. Warrant of Removal: Nontestimonial
In an illegal reentry case, the prosecution proves the defendant’s
previous removal by a document called a “warrant of removal,” which
104
memorializes both the deportation order and the physical removal.
The different fates of CNRs and warrants of removal after MelendezDiaz and Bullcoming illustrate the distinction between primary purpose
and foreseeability. The warrant of removal is signed, at the time of
physical deportation, by the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Detention and Removal agent who physically
105
That
witnesses the transportation of the alien across the border.
106
officer witnesses dozens of deportations every day, so the officer
almost certainly lacks a specific memory of any particular alien,
especially months or years later; therefore, to prove that this particular
defendant was deported, the document itself must be admitted
substantively, whether or not the officer who viewed the deportation
98. See, e.g., Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1159–60.
99. FED. R. EVID. 803(7) (providing a hearsay exception for an absence of information
in a record kept in regular course of business).
100. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 831.
101. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1162.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 1163; see also ICE Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) (stating that a primary mission of ICE
is border enforcement and removal operations).
106. See, e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 95 (2009) (noting that, in 2008, the number of
removals was 358,886, or roughly 1,000 removals per day).
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testifies at the illegal reentry trial. If that agent is not a witness, then
another agent, the custodian of the A-file, lays the foundation for
admission, identifying the document and explaining how it was created
107
and maintained in the file. This testimony poses no problem under the
108
hearsay rules, but after Crawford, and especially after Melendez-Diaz
and Bullcoming, defendants have challenged the warrants of removal as
109
violative of the Confrontation Clause.
The courts, however, have consistently held that warrants of removal
110
are nontestimonial.
In United States v. Orozco-Acosta, for example,
the government introduced the warrant of removal through the
111
testimony of the A-file custodian.
The agent who had physically
witnessed the removal and signed the form did not testify; instead, the
A-file custodian explained what the form recorded, how it was created,
112
The defendant objected, arguing that,
and how it was maintained.
under Crawford and Melendez-Diaz, he had a right to confront the
113
agent who personally witnessed his departure.
The warrant of
114
removal, he argued, was like the forensic lab report in Melendez-Diaz.
The Ninth Circuit emphatically rejected that argument:
Melendez-Diaz . . . repeatedly emphasized that the certificates of
analysis in that case were prepared solely for use at the
defendant’s trial. Unlike the certificates of analysis in MelendezDiaz, neither a warrant of removal’s sole purpose nor even its
primary purpose is use at trial. A warrant of removal must be
prepared in every case resulting in a final order of removal . . .
and nothing in the record or judicially noticeable suggests that
more than a small fraction of these warrants ultimately are used
115
in immigration prosecutions.
116

Other circuits have treated warrants of removal the same way.

107. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 833 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled in
part on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
108. See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (public records).
109. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1161.
110. See infra note 116 and accompanying text (citing cases).
111. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1160.
112. Id. at 1160–61.
113. Id. at 1161.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1163–64 (internal citations omitted).
116. Id. (“The [warrant of removal’s] primary purpose is to memorialize the deportation,
not to prove facts in a potential future criminal prosecution.” (citing United States v. Burgos,
539 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Torres–Villalobos, 487 F.3d 607, 613 (8th
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Two elements of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis are important here.
117
First is the stark rejection of the “foreseeability” test.
The court
acknowledges that Crawford used foreseeability language as one
118
possible formulation of the definition of “testimonial.” But the Court
in Crawford did not adopt that formulation as its definition and, in fact,
119
explicitly declined to provide a definition. Then, in Davis, the Court
120
did adopt a definition—the primary purpose test —which is narrower
and less inclusive than the foreseeability test. The circuits have thus
correctly rejected attempts to make foreseeability of prosecution, and
use of the statement in that prosecution, the rubric for admissibility.
The second important element is the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of
statistics to inform the primary purpose analysis.
E. The Use of Statistical Evidence to Inform the Primary Purpose
Analysis
Primary purpose certainly means more than mere foreseeability. In
Orozco-Acosta, the Ninth Circuit recognized that statistical evidence
might shed light on whether prosecution is likely to occur—and whether
prosecution may therefore be considered the primary purpose of the
121
activity. The court dove into statistics: “To illustrate, we take judicial
Cir. 2007) (“Warrants of deportation are produced under circumstances objectively indicating
that their primary purpose is to maintain records concerning the movements of aliens and to
ensure compliance with orders of deportation, not to prove facts for use in future criminal
prosecutions.”). Melendez-Diaz cannot be read to establish that the mere possibility that a
warrant of removal—or, for that matter, any business or public record—could be used in a
later criminal prosecution renders it testimonial under Crawford. See United States v.
Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2008) (“That a piece of evidence may become
‘relevant to later criminal prosecution’ does not automatically place it within the ambit of
‘testimonial.’ . . . [Otherwise,] any piece of evidence which aids the prosecution would be
testimonial and subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.”).
117. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64.
118. Id. at 1164.
119. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
120. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
121. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64 (only very few warrants of removal are later
used in criminal prosecutions). Primary purpose might mean primacy in frequency or
primacy in depth; that is, primacy in terms of quantity (frequency) or quality (depth).
Orozco-Acosta, and this Article, suggest that primacy in frequency should be taken into
account. See id. Perhaps quality should also be considered because interactions that lead to
prosecutions may be more “impactful” on both the alien and U.S. resources, and in this
regard, the ubiquity of plea bargaining may weigh in the analysis, at least to the extent that
statements from interactions with a primarily criminal investigatory purpose may never have
occasion to be used at a criminal trial in contravention of the Sixth Amendment. However,
such analysis regarding quality is beyond the scope of this Article.
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notice of the fact that while nearly 281,000 aliens were removed from
the United States pursuant to final orders of removal in 2006, just over
17,000 federal prosecutions for immigration offenses were commenced
122
during approximately the same time period.” Seventeen thousand out
of two hundred eighty-one thousand yields a 6% chance that any
particular warrant of removal will later end up as evidence in a criminal
trial as opposed to simply being part of the civil process of removing a
person from this country. And of those 17,000 prosecutions, only
approximately two-thirds, or around 12,000, were for reentry after
123
deportation.
Orozco-Acosta provides a template for determining the primary
purpose of an inquiry when dealing with an agency that serves functions
other than, or in addition to, pure law enforcement and prosecution:
What is the statistical likelihood of the various possible outcomes of the
124
interaction? Foreseeability does not help because the outcomes are all
foreseeable. The question is which outcome is primary.
As explored further below, Border Patrol field interviews are
paradigmatic examples of this dynamic. Agents who detain people in
the desert ask the core question, “Where are you from?” As they do so,
the agents are always aware that the answers might end up being
125
introduced against the interrogee and others in criminal prosecutions.
But to determine whether obtaining that statement for a criminal
prosecution is the primary purpose of the interaction, courts should
follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead by considering that criminal investigatory
purpose in light of the other, and likely predominant, purposes that such
questioning might serve in Border Patrol interactions, such as referring
aliens caught crossing illegally to immigration authorities for removal
proceedings.
Removal proceedings do not implicate the Confrontation Clause
126
Orozco-Acosta and the other
because they are civil, not criminal.
122. Id. at 1164 n.5 (citing 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note
106; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 225711, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 23–24 tbl.4.1 (2006)).
123. See Immigration Enforcement, Criminal Statutes in DHS-Immigration Convictions,
by Court, FY2004, TRACDHS, http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/highlights/v04/dhsoffcourt.html (last
visited Jan. 11, 2013) [hereinafter DHS-Immigration Convictions, by Court, FY2004].
124. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64.
125. See, e.g., id. at 1162.
126. An alien would never have a Confrontation Clause claim in a deportation hearing
itself because confrontation rights are criminal trial rights. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 50 (2004); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI. An alien has, however, certain due process rights

09 MASON (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/13/2013 5:12 PM

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND BORDER PATROL

813

circuit cases in accord with it either explicitly or implicitly conclude that
creating evidence for civil deportation proceedings does not implicate the
127
Confrontation Clause in a subsequent criminal trial.
After all, as
Orozco-Acosta explicitly held, because warrants of deportation are
128
produced for (civil) deportation proceedings, they are not testimonial.
This Article builds on Orozco-Acosta, reviews additional data from
the Border Patrol, and concludes that criminal prosecution is likely not
the primary purpose of interactions between Border Patrol agents and
persons they encounter in the desert near the border.
III. MULTIFUNCTION AGENCIES AND RELATIVE LIKELIHOODS OF
DIFFERENT TYPES OF FUTURE PROCEEDINGS
Determining the primary purpose of an interaction is difficult even
when limited to cases involving police officers responding to reported
crimes. Even in those situations, the purpose of a given interaction
cannot easily be shoehorned into either “emergency response” or
129
“collecting evidence for prosecution.” In this section, we add another
level of complexity. We ask the Davis question in a relatively uncharted
but doctrinally revealing context: When a Border Patrol agent first
encounters a person in a remote area near the border, the agent’s first
questions may well include, “Who are you?” “Where are you from?”
and “Do you have permission to be in the United States?” Are the
person’s answers testimonial in nature?
Border Patrol interactions provide a useful lens through which to
consider the scope of modern Confrontation Clause doctrine because,
while Border Patrol agents carry guns and make arrests, the Border
130
Patrol has a principally civil function: immigration enforcement. Even
when investigating past events (as opposed to responding to ongoing
emergencies), the legal proceedings flowing from the agents’

at such a hearing. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”); see U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
127. See, e.g., Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1164.
128. Id.
129. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are other situations, aside from
ongoing emergencies, when statements are not procured for the primary purpose of collecting
evidence for prosecution. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011); supra text
accompanying note 74.
130. See ICE Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., www.ice.gov/about/overview
(last visited Jan. 17, 2013); supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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investigations will likely be civil (deportation), not criminal.
How
much should this matter for Confrontation Clause purposes? Is P-1 a
“witness against” P-2 for purposes of the Clause if P-1 made a statement
in response to the officer’s question when the most likely outcome of the
interaction was to establish facts for use in a civil deportation
proceeding? Recall that primary purpose is determined objectively
132
from both the officer’s and the declarant’s perspectives. What could
be more objective than statistical likelihood? If criminal prosecution is
a theoretical possibility, but rarely occurs, how heavily should that weigh
in the analysis? How likely do criminal prosecutions have to be in
practice, when compared with ubiquitous civil proceedings, to become
the primary purpose of the interaction? Does it matter if the particular
133
agent has “an eye toward” criminal prosecution?
The Border Patrol is a useful heuristic for exploring the numerical
aspect of “primacy.” The Crawford analysis has always emphasized the
“eye toward” prosecution, so we must ask at what point that “eye”
134
becomes “prosecutorial.” We suggest that the answer comes, at least
partially, from statistics.
A. The Border Patrol: An Ideal Hermeneutic
The Border Patrol presents an ideal framework for predicting the
future course of the Court’s Confrontation Clause doctrine for several
reasons. First, the type of statements elicited from interrogees by agents
135
Second, the
is narrowly circumscribed by context and training.
answers will be potentially incriminating if the interrogee and his
travelling companions are aliens without permission to be in the United
136
States. Third, asking the questions is a necessary prerequisite to the
131. See Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1163–64. Recall that the Sixth Amendment applies
to criminal proceedings, but not civil cases.
132. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160–62; see supra text accompanying notes 58–59, 72.
133. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004) (“Involvement of
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique
potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with
which the Framers were keenly familiar.” (emphasis added)).
134. Id. Little has changed since Crawford, even if the plurality’s opinion in Williams
further limits the primacy test to specific targeted individuals. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S.
Ct. 2221, 2242 (2012).
135. Border Patrol Agents may briefly question people regarding their citizenship and
immigration status. See, e.g., 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 319 (2008).
136. Illegal entry is a crime, as is reentry after deportation. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326
(2006). Thus, potential use in a criminal prosecution inheres in virtually every interview.
What makes the question intriguing is that, statistically speaking, very few illegal aliens are

09 MASON (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/13/2013 5:12 PM

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND BORDER PATROL

815

137

exercise of the agents’ statutory authority. Fourth, the event (whether
or not a true “emergency”) is ongoing. Fifth, the agency’s mission is
overwhelmingly civil, and it intersects only infrequently with criminal
138
prosecution.
Every day, Border Patrol agents discover people who the agents
139
reasonably suspect are aliens.
Their suspicion usually is based on
proximity to the border and attempts to evade immigration
140
authorities. For example, people found hiding bushes in the desert a
mile north of the U.S.–Mexico border along a known smuggling path are
141
circumstantially likely to be aliens.
People found at a U.S. highway
checkpoint on a road heading north from the border are also
142
circumstantially likely to be aliens. The Border Patrol agent then asks
two questions of the suspected aliens: “What is your nationality?” and
143
“Do you have legal permission to be in the United States?”
actually prosecuted for entry or reentry. Obviously, in absolute numbers there are many such
prosecutions, around 40%–50% of the total federal caseload. DORIS MEISSNER ET AL.,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 7, 94 (2013). But compared to the number of actual
apprehensions of illegal aliens by the Border Patrol, the number of prosecutions is small.
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006).
138. See United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1163–64 (2010); see also ICE
Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., www.ice.gov/about/overview (last visited Jan. 17,
2013).
139. See MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 139; supra notes 122–23 and accompanying
text; see, e.g., Brady McCombs, A Day in the Desert, U. N. COLO., http://www.unco.edu/northe
rnvision/fall2012/border.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (noting 950–1600 apprehensions a day
in Tucson alone).
140. J. Alan Bock, Validity of Border Searches and Seizures by Customs Officers, 6
A.L.R. FED. 317 (1971) (“[The] practice of illegal aliens to walk across border or of smugglers
to backpack contraband over border in remote desert areas between border checkpoints is
well known . . . .”).
141. Id.
142. Cf. United States v. Rocha–Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 477–79 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming
finding of reasonable suspicion for a stop that occurred one-and-one-half miles from the
border in an area known for alien smuggling).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 2005),
overruled in part on other grounds by Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009);
United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2000).
Courts have uniformly held that these interactions constitute permissible Terry stops
(rather than custodial arrests), and thus no Miranda warnings are required. See Hudson, 210
F.3d at 1190 (“Miranda only applies when an individual is subject to ‘custodial
interrogation.’”). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit a police officer from stopping and frisking a suspect in public without
probable cause to arrest, as long as the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the
person is committing or is about to commit a crime and has reasonable belief that the person
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Assume the following scenario, which is common along the U.S.
144
border with Mexico: A Border Patrol agent arrests two people in the
desert. From his observations, he thinks Person #1 is a guide and is
leading Person #2. He detains them both and asks them their names and
nationalities. Both admit they are from Mexico. He brings them back
to the station for processing. P-1’s name produces no “hits” in the
immigration database, so P-1 is voluntarily returned to Mexico that
evening.
But P-2’s name turns up on a coyote watch list. P-2 is charged with
145
Normally, in such cases, P-1
alien smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
146
would be kept as a material witness, but in this case P-1 has already
returned to Mexico. At P-2’s trial, the government seeks to prove P-1’s
nationality by introducing his admissions through the Border Patrol
agent who interviewed him. P-2 objects under the Confrontation
Clause. What results?
147
This occurs not infrequently in the Southwest border districts. As
noted, ideally the government figures out whom it will prosecute for a
§ 1324 violation and detains the smuggled aliens as material witnesses in
those cases, either for live testimony or for pre-trial depositions as
contemplated by the statute (and which courts have held fulfills the
148
Confrontation Clause’s requirements). But the ideal does not always
149
Sometimes a material witness who is out on bond
come to pass.
150
absconds; sometimes a defendant in custody for another crime is not
may be armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The Court in Miranda v.
Arizona held that a suspect under a custodial arrest must be informed of his right to consult
with an attorney and his right to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45
(1966).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010).
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006) (bringing in and harboring certain aliens).
146. Caleb E. Mason, The Use of Immigration Status in Cross-Examination of Witnesses:
Scope, Limits, Objections, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 549, 582 (2010) (“For example, in aliensmuggling prosecutions under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, smuggled aliens are often held as material
witnesses.”).
147. See, e.g., Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1159.
148. Mason, supra note 146, at 582–83 n.147 (“Notwithstanding any provision of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the videotaped (or otherwise audiovisually preserved) deposition
of a witness to a violation of [the statute] who has been deported or otherwise expelled from
the United States, or is otherwise unable to testify, may be admitted into evidence . . . .”
(alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d) (2006))). The alien must have been
provided an opportunity for cross-examination under the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(d).
149. Mason, supra note 146, at 583.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (Supp. V 2011) (permitting detention of material witnesses to
secure trial testimony).
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identified as a guide or coyote until after all the potential witnesses have
151
been removed from the United States.
If, in the hypothetical above, P-1 answers that he and P-2 are aliens
without legal permission to be in the United States, the Border Patrol
agent keeps P-1 and P-2 in custody and processes them for
152
The key question, then, should be: What is the ex ante
deportation.
likelihood that a given contact between a Border Patrol agent and a
person reasonably suspected of illegal entry will result in the filing of a
criminal charge? Is building evidence for use in a criminal prosecution
the primary purpose of that interaction? Or is the agent more likely
building evidence for civil deportation?
1. Using Statistical Data on Apprehension Outcomes
Bryant makes clear that an objective standard should be used in
153
determining whether a questioner’s primary purpose is prosecutorial.
In a field where the goal is to determine an officer’s “intent,” such
objectivity is refreshing. And little is thought to be more objective than
statistical data.
To get a sense of how statistical data might inform a given case, we
compared the number of Border Patrol apprehensions in the Southwest
to the number of immigration prosecutions in the same region.
In Fiscal Year 2008, according to government data, Border Patrol
agents apprehended 724,000 people, and the government prosecuted
154
68,000 cases. Around 85% of all those immigration prosecutions were
155
Border Patrol referrals, meaning that there were approximately 57,800
criminal cases that might require proof at trial of what was said in a field
156
encounter, or just less than 8% of total apprehensions. Thus, in 2008,
151. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1988) (discussing material
witness in an alien smuggling action who was removed from United States before trial).
152. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006).
153. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160–62 (2011).
154. Some 48,000 of those were illegal entry cases. Illegal Reentry Becomes Top
Criminal Charge, TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013); Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels in FY 2009,
TRACIMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/218/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013)
[hereinafter Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels].
155. Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels, supra note 154 (noting an 84.8%
referral rate in 2009); Surge in Immigration Prosecutions Continues, TRACIMMIGRATION,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/188/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Surge in
Immigration Prosecutions Continues] (noting an 87% referral rate in 2008).
156. The most recent figures suggest a criminal prosecution rate upwards of 20%.
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a Border Patrol agent could reasonably expect that each encounter and
arrest carried an 8% likelihood of a resulting a criminal prosecution.
The national numbers are averages from highly variable individual
regions. Such variation stems not only from proximity to the border,
length of the border, and the degree of border protection, but also from
less appreciated causes such as charging policies, which vary significantly
from region to region. For example, some regions charge misdemeanor
illegal entry in first-crossing cases, while others have a more lenient
157
And indeed the greatest policy variation—and thus
charging policy.
potentially the broadest and the narrowest charging policies—may well
158
be found in the regions with highest crossing volumes.
To further illustrate the point, every reentry case in the Southern
159
District of California that occurred in October 2010 was coded. That
District is a high-volume border district that stretches from the coast to
the Arizona border and shares the border with two major Mexican cities
(Tijuana and Mexicali) as well as including vast stretches of desert and
160
mountain regions that are popular crossing routes. The data showed
161
that 180 illegal reentry criminal cases were filed. Of those, 121 were
MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 94. These statistics show that numbers of criminal
prosecutions are on the rise vis-à-vis numbers of apprehensions. At some point, as the
percentage of prosecutions continues to rise, encounters between aliens and Border Patrol
agents will take on a primary purpose of criminal investigation. Has that tipping point
already been reached at the 20% level? Certainly, we are edging ever closer.
157. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 97 (describing the rigid charging policies
involved in certain regions that are not present in other regions).
158. Border districts differ greatly in prosecution strategies. One obvious example is
“Operation Streamline,” in which as many apprehended aliens as possible are charged with
misdemeanor § 1325 illegal entry. See Southwest Border Security Operations, NATIONAL
IMMIGRATION FORUM 1, 8 (2010), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Southw
estBorderSecurityOperations.pdf. Arizona and Texas have experimented with this program,
but it is difficult to administer because of sheer numbers. Id. Moreover, the procedural
shortcuts—for example, mass meetings with a single attorney, mass plea colloquies,
immediate mass sentencing—may present due process problems that other districts do not
want to risk.
The Southern District of California, for example, has never adopted
streamlining policies, which no doubt accounts for its lower prosecution likelihood. Id. at 1.
159. Primary data on file with co-author Caleb Mason. Each case was coded for the
following categories: district, case number, case name, filing date, agency, encounter type,
whether statements were elicited, the number of aliens encountered, the location of the
encounter, and a miscellaneous box for other comments. The initial charge in these cases was
illegal reentry because this region generally does not file criminal charges for a first entry
absent some unusual circumstances.
160. Federal Judicial Districts, California, FEDSTATS (Jan. 17, 2013),
www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/fjd/06fjd.html.
161. Primary data on file with co-author Caleb Mason.
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Border Patrol desert cases in which an agent would have had an
interaction with the alien and would ask questions such as, “Where are
162
you from?”
In determining the likelihood of a criminal prosecution, we must
divide the number of Border Patrol cases by the total number of Border
Patrol apprehensions in that region during the same time period. Thus,
the numerator is 121. Border Patrol agents in the two sectors in the
Southern District (San Diego Sector and El Centro Sector)
apprehended 6543 individuals in October 2010, making the denominator
163
6543.
So out of 6543 Border Patrol apprehensions, there were 121
164
That means that only 1.8% of apprehensions
criminal prosecutions.
resulted in criminal cases.
The Southern District of California sample thus indicates that a
reasonable Border Patrol agent there would have a subjective
expectation that only 1.8% of apprehensions would result in criminal
charges. To perhaps put the matter more starkly, a reasonable agent
would have a 98.2% certainty that, for any particular arrest, there would
be no criminal charges.
And, as we look backwards, the likelihood of prosecution decreases
significantly. In the past three years, prosecutions have generally been
165
up while apprehensions have been dropping, making the likelihood of
criminal prosecution higher today than ever before (or, conversely, the
166
likelihood of prosecution lower in the past than it is today). In 1996,
for example, apprehensions numbered 1.6 million, and total immigration
167
prosecutions numbered a mere 8000. And the 85% referral rate from
162. The rest were ICE jail sweeps, referrals from local law enforcement, or port-ofentry apprehensions. The data suggests that, as a rule of thumb, at least for the Southern
District of California, we can look at the number of reported immigration prosecutions and
take two-thirds of that as the number of cases originating with the Border Patrol. Primary
data on file with co-author Caleb Mason.
163. Primary data on file with co-author Caleb Mason. In fact, 2010 was a low year for
apprehensions nationwide—the lowest in decades—down from highs of almost 1.7 million
earlier in the decade. MEISSNER ET AL., supra note 136, at 3.
164. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
165. Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecution, TRAC IMMIGRATION,
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283/; see also Julia Preston, Arizona
Border Quiets after Gains in Security, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2013, at A1 (noting a 78% decline
in apprehensions along the Arizona border from 2005 to present).
166. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
167. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED
STATES BORDER PATROL: NATIONWIDE ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS FISCAL YEARS
1925–2011 (2011) (documenting nearly 1.6 million apprehensions in 1996); DHS-Immigration
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2008 likely cannot be used because the Border Patrol in 1996 was less
168
than one-half its 2008 size. But even assuming that the 85% rate could
apply, that would generate 6800 prosecutions from 1.6 million
169
apprehensions. The result is just four tenths of one percent. In other
words, for any given arrest, the Border Patrol agent in 1996 would have
had a reasonable belief that there was a 99.6% chance that criminal
charges would not be filed. How, in such circumstances, could
questioning reasonably be held to have been done “with an eye toward
170
[criminal prosecution]”?
So, in short, depending on the temporal and geographical breadth of
the framing analysis, the statistics show a range of less than 1% to as
much as 20%, as a reasonable ex ante expectation of the likelihood that
171
a given apprehension will result in a criminal prosecution. The highest
percentage the statistics currently permit is 20%, unless a particular
district has a higher prosecution rate. In such a district, obviously,
defendants would have a stronger claim that statements elicited from
the putative aliens were testimonial.
Assuming for the moment that the 20% figure is aberrant (the result
of having high numbers of prosecutions as holdovers from previous
charging policies while having low numbers of apprehensions as Border
Patrol activities have been scaled back), and taking the 2008 figure of
just slightly less than 8%, can one reasonably conclude that an outcome
with only an 8% likelihood is the primary purpose of a particular
interaction?
A gut-level reaction is no, particularly given that
substantially more than 8% of the apprehensions will result in civil
deportation. Perhaps the answer to the same question for the 20%
172
figure is yes.
Convictions, by Court, FY2004, supra note 123 (documenting approximately 8,000 criminal
prosecutions in 1996).
168. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED
STATES BORDER PATROL: BORDER PATROL AGENT STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (2011)
(noting that from 1996 to 2008 the number of Border Patrol agents increased from 5942 to
17,499).
169. Immigration Prosecutions at Record Levels, supra note 154 (noting an 84.8%
referral rate in 2009); Surge in Immigration Prosecutions Continues, supra note 155 (noting an
87% referral rate in 2008). To determine the 6800 prosecutions, we took 85% (referral rate)
of the 8000 total prosecutions.
170. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004).
171. See supra note 156 for further information regarding the 20% figure.
172. The ability of the framework in this Article to adapt to these new and changing
circumstances supplies even more reason to adopt this flexible approach that is rooted in
objective fact.
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Other factors may complicate the analysis: For example, is there
another obvious possible primary purpose candidate? Are there other
contexts in which courts have treated an unlikely eventuality as the
173
“primary” purpose of government action? And most immediately, for
litigation, what should be done about the disparity between the national
and regional figures? Further, what level of generality should be used?
Which numbers should courts use? A good case can be made that
the best numbers will be those from the district itself, and not national
numbers. Numbers from, for example, the Southern District of Texas
are not intuitively relevant to the Southern District of California—or to
a northern border state like North Dakota—especially given that the
Southern District of Texas has adopted the streamline program and the
174
Southern District of California has refused to do so.
On the other
hand, one could argue that, at least to the extent Border Patrol training
is uniform and the apprehension methodology taught and practiced by
agents is independent of the prosecution strategies developed by U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, the national numbers could be used. A court might
also consider it relevant whether agents in the field were aware of the
local U.S. Attorney’s Office’s charging policies. Knowledge of charging
policies might change the result of the primary purpose inquiry.
And, of course, the whole debate would be merely academic if a
court held that even the highest estimate of relative likelihood—
175
20% —is, as a matter of law, too low to count as “primary.” A court
might well hold that, given that there is another and more predominant
purpose, namely, civil deportation, these interactions are not initiated
for the primary purpose of securing evidence in a criminal prosecution—
even if criminal prosecution results in 20% of the interactions. The
Border Patrol’s primary mission is to keep aliens from getting in—not
176
necessarily to prosecute them criminally afterwards. The key doctrinal
point is that the Court’s Confrontation Clause test focuses on “primary”

173. This Article does not mean to suggest that qualitative analysis should not be
considered in the primary purpose analysis, only that quantitative analysis should
substantially inform the inquiry. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
174. Lauren Gambino, Program Prosecutes Illegal Immigrants Before Deporting Them,
ASU NEWS21, http://asu.news21.com/2010/prosecuting%20-illegal-immigrants/ (last visited
Jan. 17, 2013); see also supra note 158 and accompanying text (regarding Operation
Streamline).
175. See, e.g., supra note 156 and accompanying text.
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
176. See
About
CBP,
U.S.
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
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purpose, not “one among several coexisting purposes.”
No one would claim that Border Patrol agents are unaware of the
possibility of prosecution. But foreseeability is simply not the Supreme
178
Court’s test.
An 8% likelihood of prosecution cannot be the
“primary” or predominant outcome.
A 20% likelihood moves
substantially closer to the “primary” mark.
2. Intake Policies
Finally, much will depend on the nature of the district’s
apprehension and, as noted above, intake guidelines. For example, in
an unpublished post-Crawford decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed a
port-of-entry smuggling case and held that the agent’s interaction with
the smuggled alien, after the arrest of the smuggler, was testimonial
179
Thus, at the
because of the local U.S. Attorney’s charging policies.
driver’s trial the agent could not present the statement from the
180
smuggled alien that he was from Mexico. Such testimony violated the
181
Confrontation Clause because criminal prosecution was likely.
The court explained:
We conclude that the witness’s statement that he was a citizen of
Mexico, made during an interrogation being conducted as part of
the investigation immediately following Solorio’s arrest, was
testimonial. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct.
2266, 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (holding that statements in
response to police interrogation are testimonial “when the
circumstances [surrounding their giving] objectively indicate that
there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose
of the investigation is to establish or prove past events
182
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution”).
This analysis is probably right, assuming that the interview of the
smuggled alien occurred after a reasonable agent would have
183
determined that the smuggling case met the district’s intake guidelines.
177. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
178. Id.; see supra note 90 and accompanying text (regarding the differences between
foreseeability and primary purpose).
179. United States v. Solorio–Gonzalez, 188 Fed. Appx. 631, 634 (9th Cir. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (alteration in original) (omissions in original) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813 (2006)).
183. The fact of arrest is not sufficient because Border Patrol may arrest aliens for civil
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If the case had been, for example, a run-of-the-mill trunk case with one
or two occupants, then the outcome should change, since these cases are
rarely prosecuted as the statistics explored above readily show. In the
usual scenario, reasonable agents will know that the trunk case does not
meet intake guidelines and thus will not be prosecuted. Therefore, in
the usual scenario, the Solorio-Gonzalez reasoning for finding a
statement testimonial because of the strong likelihood of prosecution
should not apply.
Indeed, in the Miranda context, the Ninth Circuit has held that
custodial questioning on immigration status and nationality by
immigration agents is categorically not “interrogation” where the
184
By
purpose of the questioning is referral for civil deportation.
contrast, where a prosecutorial purpose can be inferred, custodial
185
questioning is “interrogation” for Miranda purposes.
The Miranda test, of course, with respect to its definition of
“interrogation,” sweeps much more broadly than the Confrontation
Clause test with respect to its definition of “testimonial.” The Miranda
test asks whether incrimination is “reasonably likely” to result from the
186
custodial interview. But in answering that question, courts do examine
“purpose” evidence, which would certainly bear on the Confrontation
187
Clause analysis as well. For example, the Ninth Circuit analyzed one
Miranda challenge as follows:
The responses elicited from Gonzalez–Sandoval by the [B]order
[P]atrol agents were used to help prove the charges of illegal
entry and being a deported alien found in the United States.
Agent Vasquez had reason to suspect that Gonzalez–Sandoval
was in this country illegally and the questions he posed were
“reasonably likely” to elicit responses which would substantiate
the charge that Gonzalez–Sandoval had violated 8 U.S.C. §

immigration infractions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2006) (vesting Border Patrol agents with
authority “to arrest any alien . . . entering or attempting to enter the United States in
violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance of [immigration] law”).
184. United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002).
185. United States v. Gonzalez–Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 1990).
186. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301–02 (1980). Of course, Miranda is also
narrower than the Confrontation Clause in that it applies only to “custodial” interrogation,
while the Confrontation Clause has no such limit. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45
(1966).
187. Innis, 446 U.S at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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188

1326.

Query what answer might result on the same fact pattern in a
Confrontation Clause challenge. Given the statistics for prosecution, it
would seem that the fact the agent had “reason to suspect” criminal
189
activity would not suffice to make the statement testimonial, even
though it did suffice to render the interaction “interrogation” for
Miranda purposes. Indeed, the case illustrates the difference between
190
Miranda is an objective test about the likely
the two doctrines.
191
prosecutorial utility of the information disclosed (and about whether a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have felt free to
leave, an inquiry not implicated here), while the Confrontation Clause
test, even as refracted through the objective “reasonable observer” lens
of the Bryant analysis, is about the primary purpose of the
192
conversation. The likelihood of an outcome is not commensurate with
193
its primary purpose.
Thus, a reasonable Border Patrol agent who knows the local intake
policies may find good reason to tread lightly for both Miranda and
Confrontation Clause purposes (at least insofar as the agent cares about
the admissibility of statements made by the person whom he is
questioning). On the Miranda side, the bar for interrogation is rather
low—whether incrimination is reasonably likely; on the Confrontation
Clause side, a case that meets a region’s intake policies is well on its way
to criminal prosecution, thereby potentially tripping the primary
purpose trigger.
B. Wider Applications
In sum, our proposal regarding the primary purpose test for
Confrontation Clause analysis builds on two of the principal holdings
from Supreme Court precedent: First, that classification of a
government agent’s primary purpose is a practical, fact-intensive
194
inquiry; and second, that there are numerous possible government188. Gonzalez–Sandoval, 894 F.2d at 1047.
189. Id.
190. That is, there will be situations in which a statement taken from a witness will be
suppressed as against that witness per Miranda, but will be admissible against third parties per
Davis and Bryant.
191. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
192. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
193. See id.
194. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 (2011).
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agent purposes for gathering information other than investigation in
preparation for prosecution, and that if any of those alternative
195
purposes is primary, then the statement is nontestimonial.
We may
now consider the statistical likelihood of prosecution, and speculate with
some reasonable confidence about other applications of the primary
purpose doctrine outside of police emergency response.
1. Community Caretaking
Statements made in “community caretaking” investigations have not
been analyzed by any court as a distinct Confrontation Clause
196
modality.
Courts have long recognized community caretaking as
197
conceptually distinct from emergencies and investigating past crimes.
Forty years ago, in Cady, the Supreme Court recognized the
“community caretaking” function of police:
Some [police–citizen] contacts will occur because the officer may
believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many
more will not be of that nature. Local police officers . . .
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim
of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term,
may be described as community caretaking functions, totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
198
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Bryant opens up space for the government to argue that statements
taken by police in their caretaking function are like those taken in their
emergency response function—that is, not investigative and thus not
199
testimonial. It does not appear that any case has yet so held. Indeed,
there are more than 1200 state cases discussing the community
caretaking function, but only three of them in the same paragraph as
200
“testimonial”—and those are all pre-Davis.
195. Id. at 1155.
196. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
197. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. An AllFeds in a WestLaw Classic search returned zero results for (caretaking &
testimonial & Bryant), indicating that no federal court has had yet analyzed the caretaking
function in light of Bryant. WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2013)
(subscription required). An AllStates search yielded one result, but the court was not citing
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause case. Thus, no court appears to have
confronted this issue. Id.
200. And all are from Massachusetts. Commonwealth v. Tang, 845 N.E.2d 407, 412
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2. Drunk Driving Checkpoints
Another example is the drunk-driving checkpoint. In 1990, the
Supreme Court held that a State’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the lack of
201
particularized suspicion for the stops.
The Court’s reasoning with
respect to the Fourth Amendment may prove instructive regarding the
statistical analysis proposed in this Article for determining whether an
interaction is “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment.
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court
concluded that there is a drunk-driving epidemic in the United States,
and that, annually, 25,000 people die because of alcohol-related
202
accidents.
At the particular checkpoint involved in that case, 126
203
vehicles entered the checkpoint, and only two drivers were arrested.
204
That is, about 1.6% of the drivers were arrested. For purposes of the
Confrontation Clause, this small number of arrests compared to stops
suggests that the primary purpose of the roadblock was not to arrest
drivers for a later criminal prosecution for drunk driving, but to prevent
205
drunk driving in the first place. Indeed, that is what the Court found
with respect to the Fourth Amendment case: The State had a strong
206
interest in “preventing drunken driving,” not just in arresting people
who were driving drunk.
3. General Crime Control: New York City Stop-and-Frisk Interactions
New York City’s “stop-and-frisk” interactions provide another
example. Suppose an NYPD officer stops and frisks a young man—
something that happens around seven hundred thousand times a year in
207
New York City. The officer grabs young Billy, pushes him up against
the wall, and pats him down. While doing so, he asks: “Do you have any
weapons?” Billy says, “No, but I just saw Johnny hiding a gun under
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
201. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
202. Id. at 451.
203. Id. at 454.
204. Id. at 455.
205. Moreover, even if the motivation was to catch drunk drivers, primary purpose is
determined objectively (not subjectively), and, this Article suggests, that determination
should be informed, at least in part, by statistical evidence of likelihood of outcome. The very
low likelihood of arrest belies a primary purpose of criminal investigation.
206. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
207. Stop and Frisk Data, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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that trash can when you came walking up.” Johnny, it turns out, is a
suspect in a murder case. The District Attorney (DA) had a weak
circumstantial case against Johnny, but has a better one once the officer
recovers the gun and a crime lab matches it to the murder weapon.
However, the DA still has no forensic evidence linking the gun to
Johnny, so the statement from Billy during the stop-and-frisk becomes a
crucial link in the evidentiary chain at trial. But Billy disappears before
Johnny’s trial. May the government have the officer testify to Billy’s
statement? The testimony may fit within Federal Rule of Evidence
803(1), present sense impression, or some other exception; if so, there is
208
no hearsay problem. But does Billy’s statement nonetheless run afoul
of the Confrontation Clause?
The court must look at the primary purpose of the interaction
209
Was it the development of facts for
between the officer and Billy.
criminal prosecution? Does it matter if it was for development of facts
for a criminal prosecution in general or the criminal prosecution of
210
Johnny in particular? Or was the stop-and-frisk for something entirely
different from criminal prosecution? As it turns out, the NYPD has had
in place, for more than two decades, a policy of widespread stop-andfrisk policing that, statistically, appears to have very little relationship to
211
the prosecution of crimes.
According to the most recent data, collected by the NYPD itself, of
the approximately 685,000 people stopped and frisked in 2011 in New
212
York, only 12% were arrested or issued summonses. That percentage
has been steady for the full ten-year period for which the department
213
has data. And those data are citywide. Some precincts had even lower
214
percentages. For example, in the Bushwick precinct in Brooklyn, for
208. The rationale underlying the present sense impression exception is the unlikelihood
of fabrication; however, when a police officer grabs a person and frisks him, that person may
be trying to deceive the officer.
209. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). We also have to know whether the
Williams plurality’s new test for primary purpose becomes the law. In this scenario, Johnny is
a murder suspect, but he is not the target murder suspect for the particular gun about which
Billy told the officer. Under at least the plurality’s test, Billy’s statement does not seem to be
testimonial even if the purpose of the interaction was to obtain evidence for a future criminal
prosecution of someone.
210. The plurality in Williams indicates the latter, but only four Justices have adopted
that new test. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2238 (2012).
211. Stop and Frisk Data, supra note 207.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. RAYMOND W. KELLY, NYC POLICE DEP’T STOP QUESTION & FRISK ACTIVITY:
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the calendar year 2006, only 2% of stop-and-frisks resulted in arrests
and 4% in summonses; thus, for a given stop-and-frisk encounter in
Bushwick, there was an ex ante 94% likelihood that the encounter would
215
not lead to any criminal proceedings.
As with Border Patrol stops, one has to ask: Does it make sense to
label as primary an outcome that happens approximately 10% of the
time? If the New York City program were new and experimental, it
might make more sense to treat primary purpose differently because
statistics on criminal prosecutions would be unknown. But the New
York City program is twenty years old and has been dramatically
expanded over the past decade. From 2001 to 2011, the total number of
216
stop-and-frisks has risen from around 97,000 to 686,000. This program
can be conceptualized not as criminal investigation, but rather as a
217
“public safety” program, with the measure of success being guns seized
218
rather than criminal prosecutions initiated.
And considering the perspective of the reasonable person stopped
and frisked, as Bryant requires, may also lead to an interpretation of the
interaction that is not primarily focused on collecting evidence for
prosecution. As a number of commentators have pointed out, young
black men in high-stop-and-frisk neighborhoods perceive stops-andfrisks as a show of force, a brute demonstration of who is in charge, not

REPORTS PREPARED DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2006, at 2
(2006).
215. Id.
216. Stop and Frisk Data, supra note 207. The yearly totals are as follows: 2002: 97,000;
2003: 161,000; 2004: 314,000; 2005: 398,000; 2006: 506,000; 2007: 472,000; 2008: 540,000; 2009:
581,000; 2010: 601,000; 2011: 685,000. Id.
217. See Caleb Mason, The Police-Prosecutor Relationship and the No-Contact Rule:
Conflicting Incentives After Montejo v. Louisiana and Maryland v. Shatzer, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 747, 770–71 (2010).
218. That is, if the goal is simply to seize guns rather than to convict defendants, then the
actual stop-and-frisk practices make more sense. See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Success of
Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at A1.
Some street crimes officers also said they felt pressured by the department’s
emphasis on crime statistics, and that they are forced to adhere to an unwritten
quota system that demands that each officer seize at least one gun a month. “There
are guys who are willing to toss anyone who’s walking with his hands in his pockets,”
said an officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “We frisk 20, maybe 30
people a day. Are they all by the book? Of course not; it’s safer and easier to just
toss people. And if it’s the 25th of the month and you haven’t got your gun yet?
Things can get a little desperate.”
Id.
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219

as a method of gaining evidence for prosecution. That interpretation
of the interaction—while not one the government is likely to publicly
endorse—is certainly not “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events
220
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.” Indeed, part of
the complaint is precisely that the police engaged in stop-and-frisk
221
patrols are not particularly focused on investigating crime.
So for political reasons among others, the government might not
want to make the argument that stop-and-frisk interactions are
nontestimonial on the grounds that criminal prosecution is such an
unlikely eventuality. But the argument is there to be made, and the
statistics amply support it.
4. Other Potential Applications
Nor has the existing case law addressed the general methodological
question about applying the primary purpose analysis to any of the big
multifunction agencies. The framework suggested in this Article may be
applied outside Border Patrol contexts to other agencies’ interactions as
well. For example, Central Intelligence Agency interrogations later
introduced as evidence against third parties; statements taken by
“intelligence” units within the Federal Bureau of Investigation that do
not generally refer cases for prosecution; statements taken by military
personnel, especially in places in which the military has worked closely
with both intelligence services and U.S. law enforcement, and where
some in-country detainees have ultimately been charged and tried in the
222
United States; statements taken by officers of various regulatory
agencies (such as EPA, FDA, SEC, and DEA) while the agents are
serving a regulatory function; school security encounters with students;
219. Tovah Renee Calderon, Race-Based Policing from Terry to Wardlow: Steps Down
the Totalitarian Path, 44 HOW. L.J. 73, 79–80 (2000) (discussing the racially discriminatory use
of the stop-and-frisk and its perception by the black community in New York City); see also
Joseph Goldstein, A Focus on 3 Encounters in a Stop-and-Frisk Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2013, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/nyregion/focus-on-3encounters-as-trial-begins-on-stop-and-frisk-tactic.html (discussing a class action lawsuit
regarding the NYPD’s policy of “stopping hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of black
and Hispanic men and boys in the street”).
220. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
221. See Stop and Frisk Facts, NYCLU, http://www.nyclu.org/node/1598 (last visited Jan.
11, 2013).
222. Foreign Cooperative Investigations, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/fci.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
Most obviously
Afghanistan, but also Latin America, where DEA overseas “rapid response” paramilitary
task-forces work closely with local governments. Id.

09 MASON (DO NOT DELETE)

830

4/13/2013 5:12 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:793

Transportation Security Administration airport encounters; the list goes
on and on.
223
Or, for a chilling example, assume the 24 -type example: Jack Bauer
has two terrorist suspects in custody. There is a ticking time bomb in
New York City. Jack beats one of the suspects until he confesses that
the two suspects did plant a bomb, and he tells the agents where they
hid the bomb. The agents deactivate the bomb and save the City. The
suspect who confessed dies, and in the prosecution of the surviving
suspect, the agents testify about the co-conspirator’s statements. Does
224
this violate the Confrontation Clause?
Does it matter if Jack would
testify that he questioned the suspects to save the City, not to acquire
evidence for their eventual criminal prosecution (although he certainly
was aware of the possibility)? In none of these areas has any
Confrontation Clause case law yet developed. But this Article suggests
a fruitful framework for analyzing these and other cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
What factors make a statement “testimonial” for Confrontation
Clause purposes? What factors should courts examine to determine
when criminal prosecution is the primary purpose of a potential
defendant’s interactions with an agent? In Bryant, the Court recognized
that government agents serve a variety of missions, many of which are
not aimed primarily at obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution.
Bryant further teaches that the proper inquiry is a pragmatic assessment
of the actual practices, policies, and working conditions of the
government agents at issue, viewed from an objective standpoint.
Williams, which had been expected to clarify matters, unfortunately
added a layer of complexity by unsettling the definition of primary
purpose. But the muddling of what it means for a statement to have a
particular primary purpose only underscores the need for a clearer test,
such as the one proposed by this Article.
Determining whether an interaction has the primary purpose of
gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution should include statistical
analysis of the probability of future prosecution among the possible
outcomes of a particular class of interactions performed by agencies that
th

223. 24 (Imagine Entertainment, 20 Century Fox Television, 2000–2010). This
hypothetical is not taken from the show, but is of the type that might have been presented on
it.
224. There may be an evidentiary issue as well. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
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serve multiple functions, not all of which are prosecutorial. With such
data, courts can attempt, in reasonably predictable and objective ways,
to squeeze the square peg of multipurpose agencies into the round hole
of the primary purpose test.

